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Docket # 38878-2011 
Bingham County Case No. 
CV-2007-2306 
CROSS-APPELLANT GENTILLONS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding. 
Hyrum Erickson 
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PO Box 250 
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Attorney for Marcel Gentillon, Doris Gentillon and Scott Gentillon 
Dwight E. Baker 
BAKER & HARRIS 
266 West Bridge 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
Attorney for The Gentillon Partnership 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE, PA 
PO Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Attorney for Craig E. and Janice K Peterson 
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1. PROCEEDINGS TO DATE 
Wesley and Connie Gentillon and Lamon and Lori Faye Gentillon (collectively the 
Partnership) appealed this matter to the Supreme Court on multiple issues against both Craig and 
Janice Peterson (the Petersons) and Marcel and Doris Gentillon, and Scott Gentillon (the 
Gentillons). The Gentillons then cross-appealed on the issue of prevailing party status and 
attorney fees. The Partnership filed Appellants' Brief October 26,2011. The Gentillons and the 
Petersons filed Respondents' Briefs November 28,2011. The Partnership filed Appellants' 
Reply Brief on December 22,2011. The Gentillons now file their Cross Appellants' Reply Brief. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
The trial court correctly ruled that specific performance, as a remedy for breach of 
contract, is barred by the statute oflimitations. The Partnership's attempt to rely on Love v. 
Watkins, 40 Cal. 547 (1871), is unpersuasive as Love states the well know rule regarding the 
accrual of a cause of action for a resulting trust, which the trial court applied. The trial court's 
finding that the Partnership failed to show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence an intent to 
create a trust except as to the property necessary for the passage of the pivot is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. However, the trial court erred in not naming the Gentillons 
as the prevailing party on the Partnership's third party claim and not awarding them costs and 
fees pursuant to the 1998 Agreement. 
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3. ARGUMENT 
a. The district court followed the rule regarding the statute of limitations set 
out in Love. The court's ruling regarding the scope ofthe resulting trust was 
based on its finding of lack of intent, not the statute of limitations. 
The Partnership asserts that Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547 (1871) is inconsistent with the 
district court's ruling that the statute oflimitations on the Partnership'S enforcement of the 1998 
Agreement had run. Appellants' Reply Br. 5-7. However, the Partnership has correctly 
recognized that California Supreme Court's decision in Love resulted in the application of the 
resulting trust doctrine. Appellants' Reply Br. 7. The holding in Love is that the running of the 
statute of limitations on a resulting trust does not begin to run until the trust is repudiated. That 
is the rule applied by the district court in ruling that the statute of limitations on a resulting trust 
had not run. R. at 541-542. 
The district court's ruling that the resulting trust applied only to the ground necessary to 
allow the passage of the Partnership's center pivot was not based on the running of a statute of 
limitations. Rather, it was based on the lack of clear and convincing evidence of the Gentillons' 
alleged intent to transfer the property to the Partnership. R. at 673-674. The trial court's finding 
of fact regarding the intent of the parties is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Scott Gentillon testified that he had understood the agreement to be a straight trade of his father's 
Lot 16 for his Lot 1 and did not believe that the Partnership was going to receive a portion of Lot 
1. Tr. 306: 10-24; 285:8-25. Marcel and Doris Gentillon testified that at the time of the 
Agreement, they believed they owned Lot 1, not Scott. Tr. 55 :24-56: 14; 43: 12-46:21; 66:20-
67:23; 234:3-18. As such they could not have agreed to any sort of adjustment to Lot l's 
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boundaries. Consistent with that belief, Marcel further testified that when he agreed to give the 
Partnership his "riparian ground" (also referenced in the 1998 Agreement as Lot 16) he thought 
that he was going to be paid for it. Tr. 376:6-10. 
The trial court correctly applied the rule expressed in Love and the court's ruling that a 
resulting trust applied only on that portion of the property necessary for the passage of the pivot 
is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
b. The trial court correctly weighed the impact of "possession" in its decision. 
The Partnership's Reply Brief relies almost exclusively on its assertion that the 
Partnership was "in possession" of Lot 1 and that "possession" was the basis on which the trial 
court should have determined the parties' intent. Appellants' Reply Br. 2-10. The brief implies 
that there was an "exchange of possession" subsequent to the Leavitt Survey in January 1999 that 
the trial court should have relied on to determine the parties intent. Jd. However, contrary to the 
Partnership's argument, there was no "exchange of possession" consistent with the Leavitt 
Survey in 1999. The Partnership had leased and farmed the property since 1992. R. at 670; Tr. 
121 :4-13. The Gentillons have lived in the house and had their front yard on the "garden spot" 
since well before 1991 when the horne lot was separated from the rest of the farm. Tr. 424:7-
426:13. In 1999, immediately prior to the Leavitt Survey, the Gentillons had possession of the 
garden spot and the Partnership was farming the property it had formerly leased from Scott 
Gentillon. No exchange of possession was necessary or took place upon the completion of the 
Leavitt Survey. In fact, it was not until four years later, 2003, when the Partnership stopped 
farming north of the line in the Leavitt Survey and then only after Marcel built a fence around his 
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"horse pasture." Tr. 146:4-147:10. Marcel testified that he placed the fence around the horse 
pasture based on the area he was able to seed at the time. Tr. 314: 18-316: 1 O. He placed the 
fence where he ran out of grass seed - it had nothing to do with the Leavitt Survey that had been 
completed four years earlier. Id. Contrary to the impression given in the Partnership's briefing, 
there was no "exchange of possession" subsequent to the Leavitt Survey that the trial court 
should have relied on to determine the parties intentions. The trial court recognized that the 
Partnership had farmed some portion of Lot 1 and gave that appropriate weight. R. at 674. 
The trial court correctly found that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the 
Gentillons intended to hold the property in trust for the Partnership. R. at 674. 
c. The Gentillons are the prevailing party as to the third party complaint as 
they avoided all liability. 
The trial court found that the Petersons were the prevailing party and failed to name a 
prevailing party as to the third party action or even address the third party claim in its decision. 
R. at 775-776. The court's explanation of its decision as to a prevailing party consisted of the 
following: 
The decision to determine the prevailing party is within this Court's discretion. 
The Court has considered the arguments of both the Partnership and the 
Gentillons and recognizes that they have "prevailed" in some of the issues that 
have been raised. However the Court determines that on the whole, based on the 
multiple claims and issues presented and the overall outcome of the case, the 
Petersons are the prevailing party. 
R. at 776. The Partnership, in analyzing the prevailing party issue, argues that the trial court 
declined to name the Gentillons the prevailing party, not because they did not prevail, but 
because the Gentillons were somehow responsible for the "problem". Appellants' Reply Br. 17-
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18. However, ifthe Partnership is correct regarding the trial court's reasoning, the trial court's 
ruling is improper as it is reversible error for a trial court to "use the award or denial of attorney 
fees to vindicate his sense of justice beyond the judgment rendered on the underlying dispute 
between the parties" Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 
716, 720, 117 P.3d 130, 134 (2005). The trial court erred by not naming Gentillons the 
prevailing party to the third party claim when they had avoided all liability on the claim. Jd, 141 
Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. 
d. The attorney fee clause of the 1998 Agreement was applicable as the 
Partnership alleged the applicability of the attorney fees clause in their 
complaint. 
The trial court erred in analyzing the applicability of attorney fee clause in the 1998 
Agreement as it tied the applicability of the clause to the scope ofI.C. 12-120(3). R. at 774-773. 
The Partnership has agreed that trial court's analysis on this issue was flawed. Appellants' Reply 
Br. 18-19 The Partnership rests its argument against Gentillons request for attorney's fees solely 
on the issue of whether the Gentillons were a prevailing party. Jd As such there is little need for 
the matter to be addressed here except to provide an additional basis for the applicability ofthe 
award overlooked in the Gentillons' initial brief. 
The Partnership did not merely request attorney fees pursuant to the 1998 Agreement, the 
Partnership affirmatively alleged the validity and applicability ofthe attorney fees clause in the 
body of its Complaint. R. at 32, 503. Both the original Third Party Complaint and the Amended 
Third Party Complaint contain distinct counts alleging the Partnership's right to collect attorney 
fees which include the following allegation: 
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Third Party Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred, as provided 
by the Agreement for Exchange of Property and Option, at paragraph 9, which 
states as follows: 
9. Attorney's Fees. In the event of any action being necessary to 
enforce any of the terms hereof, arising from the breach of any 
provision hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive 
from the other, all costs and expenses, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not 
such claim is litigated, and including fees in bankruptcy court or 
fees on appeal. 
R. at 32,503. The Court recently held in Garner v. Pavey, 151 Idaho 462,468-471,259 P.3d 
608, 614-617 (2011), that the allegation of the existence of a commercial transaction in a 
complaint, as opposed to a mere request for attorney fees, triggers the application of the statute. 
The same is true in this case. The Partnership affirmatively alleged the existence and 
applicability of the attorney fees clause in the body of their complaint. As such, the clause was 
triggered as it applies to the Gentillons. The trial court erred in ruling that the attorney fee clause 
of the 1998 Agreement was not applicable. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Because the district court correctly found the 1998 Agreement was unenforceable, the 
Court should affirm the ruling that all remedies under it, including specific performance, are 
barred. Because the district court's ruling regarding the nature and location of any resulting trust 
were supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Court should affirm that ruling. 
However, the Court should reverse the trial court's failure to name the Gentillons the prevailing 
party as to the Partnership's third party complaint and award the Gentillons attorney's fees both 
at trial and on appeal, pursuant to the terms of the 1998 Agreement and I.C. 12-120(3). 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of January, 2012. 
,~/ f /I /1 /; .---
t:fdf j / 1 L(;. ~~~ 
Hyrum Erickson 
Attorni{y for Gentillons 
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